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Abstract
This paper introduces a multi-modal polymorphic type theory to model epis-
temic processes characterized by trust, defined as a second-order relation affect-
ing the communication process between sources and a receiver. In this language,
a set of senders is expressed by a modal prioritized context, whereas the receiver
is formulated in terms of a contextually derived modal judgement. Introduction
and elimination rules for modalities are based on the polymorphism of terms in
the language. This leads to a multi-modal non-homogeneous version of a type
theory, in which we show the embedding of the modal operators into standard
group knowledge operators.
Keywords: Testimony, Trust, Modal Type Theory, Epistemic Modalities,
Common and Distributed Knowledge.
1. Introduction
This paper introduces a multi-modal type-theoretic system to model trust-
qualified communication processes ongoing among rational agents. The formu-
lation of such a language and the analysis of its properties contributes to the
epistemic debate on testimony and it provides a novel analysis of trust-based
knowledge representation in a multi-agent system. Provided the syntactic na-
ture of the language, the resulting semantics is easily adapted to computation
within distributed networks: we focus here only on the analogy with testimony
relations.
In the epistemic debate, testimony is commonly understood as the assertion
of a declarative sentence carrying the message of a sender (S) to a receiver
(R),1 who then accepts it as true, without checking its truthfulness. From an
∗Corresponding author
1In this paper we will refer to ‘sender ’ and ‘receiver ’ of a message rather than to ‘speaker’
and ‘hearer’ to indicate the agents involved in a testimony scenario. ‘Speaker’ and ‘hearer’,
although common terms in the philosophical literature on testimony, specifically refer to verbal
communication, which is only one of the possible ways in which testimony can occur, while
‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ generally refer to a case of communication among agents, without
specifying the nature of the communication. For this reason the latter is more appropriate to
describe testimony scenarios.
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epistemological point of view, true beliefs acquired through testimony are not
(yet) justified, because they (still) lack any verification of their truthfulness. So
it seems that testimony allows the agents in the system only to achieve a weak
epistemic status, whereas a strong epistemic status can be obtained only once
the receiver of the message verifies its truthfulness.
The formal model proposed in this paper rests on two conceptual pillars,
the definition of trust as second-order property qualifying first-order relations
[72] and the analysis of testimony proposed in [73]. Before focusing on the
analysis of testimony we shall briefly recall the reader’s attention on the novelty
of the definition of trust as second-order property. Such definition clarifies that,
contrary to what a first analysis would suggest, trust is not a relation occurring
among the agents of a system. Rather it is a way in which such relations may
occur. In particular, trust qualifies a relation making it more convenient for
the agent who decides to trust (the trustor) another agent (the trustee), as
in doing so the trustor saves the resources (time and energy) that he would
deploy to perform a given task. When considered with respect to an epistemic
context, this definition of trust becomes extremely useful in understanding its
role in the processes of communication of information and knowledge among
the agents of a distributed system. This is particularly true when considering
the occurrences of testimony. According to the analysis of testimony provided
in [73] on the basis of this definition of trust, testimony is the occurrence of
first-order relations of communication qualified by the second-order property of
trust. This is the definition interpreted by the formal model described in this
paper, which interprets communication in a multi-agent system by focusing on
the distinction among agents that hold directly the relevant information and
those that have to rely on others in order to possess it. In this way, we design
communication chains that inherently use the notion of trust, defined as the
result of linking two epistemic states by way of a message passing system.
Our language is an extension of the modal polymorphic type theory with
partial term-assignment on judgements developed in [65]. The polymorphic lan-
guage serves the task of formalizing the two kinds of epistemic states involved by
a communication act: a standard constructive type preserves verification-terms
on propositions and qualifies them as ‘known contents’; a type with partial-terms
typeinf preserves only consistency and qualifies its contents as ‘information’, in
the sense of communicated but not verified contents. For each of the two kinds of
contents, an appropriate portion of the language is used. A side property of the
system is the extension of a strongly constructive language with a fragment that
accommodates a weaker epistemic notion, to use it for knowledge representation
purposes. The language has also a modal extension, based on the judgemental
modalities introduced in [64]: judgements /♦(A true) are defined to express
the reducibility of the corresponding proof constructions. Modalities are then
generalized to collections of judgements used in contexts Γ,∆, interpreted as
knowledge states. Multi-modalities are used to formalize the occurrence of dis-
tinct, prioritized sources in the communication act.
We can sum up the novelties offered by the present contribution as follows:
1. we present the first type-theoretic model of trusted communications; in
this way we extend the range of syntactic approaches to group knowledge
and provide a novel research direction for type systems;
2. the model relies on an effective representation of different epistemic states
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for rational agents, thus making an effort in the direction of realistic rep-
resentation of human knowledge processes;
3. the model endorses an innovative definition of trust. Rather than focusing
on the traditional conceptualisation of trust as a relation, it endorses a
recently provided account of this phenomenon, according to which trust is
a second-order property qualifying first-order relations. Such a definition
not only constitutes quite an innovative approach to the analysis of trust
when compared to the relevant literature, it also allows for developing
a completely new analysis of trust-communications and of their role in
the processes of knowledge communication in a distributed system, as
described in Section 2.
4. we make use of the notion of refutable content for a type system, intro-
duced in [65]; we consider this a crucial notion for the development of
epistemic logics for defeasible reasoning and, in particular, consider it es-
pecially important in its present combination with a strong verificationist
semantics, in order to combine different aspects of knowledge acquisition
processes that often are difficult to highlight in a formal setting;
5. finally, we explore the relation of this syntactic model and the thereby
defined notion of trusted communications with the well-known notions of
Distributed and Common Knowledge from epistemic logic; this direction
of research is still very young but we provide a first interesting connection
between two fields that grow largely separated from one another.
There is a growing literature on trust and the formalization of communication
acts that uses modal logics; such literature is for the greatest part developed
in the vein of model-theoretic, Kripke- and Dynamic semantics of modal log-
ics, whereas little is done in the area of proof-theoretic approaches. Our work
especially aims at providing the first type-theoretic treatment of the notion of
trusted communication. The greatest advantage of such language is that it pro-
vides a syntax with embedded meanings, so that its rules immediately define
corresponding semantic notions and a procedural semantics comes entirely nat-
ural, as done in [66] for a model of safe distributed programming. Moreover,
we exploit the predicative structure of Dependent Types in order to mimic the
behavior of communication acts. This approach is, to our knowledge, entirely
new especially because it relies on a syntactic distinction between constructors
that accommodate partial terms. Finally, we induce a modal extension of the
language which differs both from the original formulation of the type theory in
use and from the already existing contextual modal extensions.
In providing this language, we focus on the concurrent combination of the
two epistemic states that we consider essentially involved in the act of trusted
communication. Also in this case, we believe this is a rather novel approach.
The largest part of the work done in modeling trusted communications and
distrust relations comes from computer science and network analysis, where such
distinction is treated in terms of authorizations. Our treatment is clearly more
focused on the epistemic relations occurring among rational human agents. The
formal representation of epistemic acts combining weaker and stronger attitudes
represents a step forward towards more realistic approaches of human-based
communications.
As mentioned above, a conceptual novelty of this paper is related to the
definition of trust as a second order property and the reference to testimony as
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the specific instance of trusted communications. This point is largely addressed
in Section 2.
Finally, we consider both useful and important that first results in the di-
rection of identity with the (usually semantically defined) notions of Common
and Distributed Knowledge are provided, something we believe will be crucial
in future directions of this research.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical and
philosophical background on which the formal model rests. Section 3 introduces
the formal model, first in view of the non-modal fragment of the type-theoretic
system and then via its extension to modalities and multi-modalities. Section
4 clarifies the structure of our language as a non-homogeneous multi-modal
logic to express reliable communication and knowledge within the spectrum of
standard modal logics. Section 5 shows how to infer appropriate definitions
of Distributed and Common Knowledge from our language. Section 6 presents
completeness results of the syntactic language with respect to frames of standard
modal logics. Section 7 describes the debates that stand at the background
of this research: a) the epistemic debate on testimony, b) the existing formal
approaches to trusted communication relations in knowledge representation and
information systems. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper by pulling together
the threads of our analysis and it briefly describes the content of future work.
2. Testimony: the Case of Trusted Communications among the Agents
of a Distributed System
In a testimony scenario, R accepts a message by S on the basis of R’s trust
in S. R is the trustor, who accepts S’ message as true without verifying it and
only on the basis of his trust in S, while S is the trustee: she is the referent
of R’s trust. According to this analysis, the occurrences of trust are related to,
and affect, pre-existing relations, like purchasing, negotiation, delegation and,
in our case, communication. Trust is not to be considered a relation itself but
a property of relations, something that changes the way relations occur. As a
property of relations, trust affects the way relations occur by minimising the
trustor’s effort and commitment for the achievement of a given goal. It does
so in two ways. First, the trustor can avoid performing the action necessary to
achieve his goal himself, because he can count on the trustee to do it (or have
done it). This is true even in epistemic contexts in which the trustor, e.g. a
member of a jury, could not physically replace the trustee, e.g. an eyewitness.
Second, the trustor can decide not to supervise the trustee’s performance. This
is a peculiarity of trust scenarios as shown in [72], where the trustor decides
to delegate and not supervise the performance of a given task to a trustworthy
agent.2 It follows that trust can be defined thus:
2Trustworthiness is a measure of the probability that the trustee is able to perform a
given action correctly and autonomously. The criteria for the assessment of trustworthiness
vary from case to case, and may or may not be rational or objective. The level of risk
undertaken by the trustor will increase in those cases in which trustworthiness is assessed
on the basis of non-rational criteria. It is worth noting that the formal model we present
describes communications among rational agents, hence we assume that the agents of the
presented model will rationally choose the potential trustee on the basis of their reputation,
but the execution of such selection is not a task of the formal model itself. This assumption
5
Definition 1 (Trust). Assume a set of first-order relations functional to the
achievement of a goal. Assume that one such relation holds between two agents,
such that one of them (the trustor) has to achieve the given goal while the other
(the trustee) is able to perform some tasks in order to achieve that goal. If the
trustor chooses to achieve his goal through the task performed by the trustee,
and if the trustor considers the trustee a trustworthy agent, then the relation
has the property of being advantageous for the trustor. Such a property is a
second-order property called trust that affects the first-order relations occurring
between agents.3
We shall endorse this definition of trust to analyze the first-order relation
of communication of epistemic contents among agents, namely what is known
as testimony. In a testimony scenario, S transmits some information to R,4
so testimony is an instance of communication, a first-order relation. This is
a partial definition, because it does not take into consideration other aspects
of testimony, such as the goal of R of obtaining (at least) some information
by counting on the performance of S, and the absence of supervision on S’
performances. We focus on the fact that R does not verify the truthfulness of
S’ messages, nor does she verify how S elaborated the transmitted information.
Following this analysis, testimony can be defined thus:
Definition 2 (Testimony). Assume a first-order ternary relation of communi-
cation, where some information i is passed from a sender S to a receiver R. If
the communication occurs between a receiver and a trustworthy sender, and if
the receiver acquires the sender’s messages without checking their truthfulness,
then the communication is affected by the second-order property of trust. Such
an occurrence of communication is called testimony.
The reader should note that, at this point, by the definition of testimony
the truth value of the transmitted information is not specified. We consider
the information communicated by the sender as meaningful contents to which
truth is ascribed (rather than true contents), but which can still be falsified
(mis-information). We call such content functional information.
To make things clearer, consider a case of communication. The aim of this
paper is to provide a formal counterpart to the notion of testimony introduced
above and to present the appropriate formal properties of the notion of commu-
nication as exemplified below.
Over a hundred biologists are writing together an article on
molecular biology. None of them knows enough to ground the overall
conclusion of the paper, so none of them can be given a ‘strong epis-
temic status’ with respect to the whole information conveyed in the
avoids the problem of a possible stronger requirement on the definition of the trust relation,
such as that the trustee must be trustworthy. An example of a general system to evaluate
trustworthiness in actions such as negotiations, pacts and trading networks is given in [70]:
it provides an information theoretic approach where the employed notion of trust measures
the relationship between commitment and execution of contracts being given as the negative
entropy of the probability distribution of possible outcomes for a given contract.
3See [72] for the analysis in support of this definition.
4For an analysis of the nature of the message transmitted in a testimony scenario, see [73]
and [45].
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article. But, eventually, each of them provides the part of content
for which she is able to support justification. In the context of their
interaction various communication acts are in place: biologist a will
communicate to her colleague b the content of of message M , which
b does not posses nor is able to test, so that b ‘trusts’ a about the
actual truth of M . These relations are what we shall call ‘trusted
communications’ (see Definition 17): a trusted communication is a
ternary relation between the epistemic states of agents a, b and the
judgement A true that is content of the communicated message.5
According to the analysis in [73], the receiver of the message is in a weak epis-
temic status, as she accepts the message to be true on the basis of her trust in
the sender and without verifying it. The formal model expresses this aspect by
representing the epistemic content held by the receiver as a hypothesis (h), i.e.
an epistemic content that is admissibly true but has not been verified yet. The
weak status resulting from possessing content via a trusted communication is
what we shall formalize by terms of the typeinf -kind and express by the induced
♦-modality, see §3.3 and Definition 12.
The message-passing system is defined by functional expressions of the lan-
guage, in terms of dependent types. For each expression B dependent on A
in the language, we enforce the presence of an agent a which passes content
A to an agent b which holds content B true given she accepts A. We will say
that there is a hierarchical relation among a and b provided the receiver of the
message is considered dependent from the sender with respect to this message.
This communication becomes in turn trust-qualified, as b does not possess any
means to verify A, but uses it to hold B true. The verification of the message is
represented in the formal model by the reduction of h to a term via β-reduction.
An agent is said to have a strong epistemic status regarding h when she can
account for such content without relying on any other agent in the system. This
strong status is what we shall formalize by means of terms of the type-kind and
express by the induced -modality, see §3.2 and Definition 12. As the content
justified by agent a can in turn be based on some other content obtained by a
via trusted communication from agent a− 1, we will say that there is a hierar-
chy of trusted communications between agents b < a < a− 1. The hierarchical
structure of our agents seems to induce a very strong acyclic message-passage
system, which would ban any receiver of a given communication act to ever be
the sender in any other communication act involving the same agents. This
possibly problematic issue is resolved by understanding that the hierarchical
relation among agents is only induced by the dependency relation of contents
involved in the message-passing system: it is the dependency of content B from
content A that makes agent b hierarchically dependent on agent a and thus let
us say that a trust relation of b from a holds with respect to content A. The
hierarchical relation might well be reversed with respect to some other content
C.
Coming back to our biologists, looking at the whole interactions, their result
5As our formal expression always looks at the content of messaging at the Receiver state, the
model formalizes a delivery system in which communications are always successful. This would
suggest that our analysis focuses only on the cases of query-triggered testimony. Nevertheless,
the conceptual understanding of testimony remains neutral with this respect.
7
form Distributed Knowledge (DK, Theorem 1): the content of the paper can be
inferred from what each and all the biologists together know. For the content
of this distributed state to become actually knowledge for each of them, it is
necessary that the verification process that validates a content is checkable and
admissible to any peer. In the formal system this requires a notion of verification
valid over contexts, which we shall interpret in terms of canonical proof-objects.
As a result, direct verification of a content by each agent formally corresponds
to removal of any trust relation (Theorem 2) and, in turn, the attaining of
Common Knowledge (CK, Theorem 3).6
Our epistemic model deals therefore with different sorts of justifications in
order to represent qualitative differences among epistemic states. A strong no-
tion of verification is used to define a ‘strong epistemic state’ and this naturally
recalls the Platonic notion of ‘justified true belief’. The very same analogy has
been put forward in Justification Logic, see e.g. [2], [5], in which a language
based on classical propositional logic is augmented by justification assertions
t : F that read ‘t is a justification for F ’. Justification Logic assumes certain
justification principles originating from both mainstream epistemology and the
mathematical theory of proofs and use them to analyze a definition of knowledge
relying on the fact that every valid principle of modal logics of knowledge such
as T , S4, and S5 has a counterpart in it. The similarity of the two approaches is
not surprising, as Justification Logic can be traced back to the idea of provabil-
ity models of the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics (see [3]), whereas the
constructive version of Type Theory explicitly refers to the realizability models
of the very same semantics, according to the distinction that goes back to [42].
Nonetheless, major differences can be identified between the two approaches.
In the first place, Justification Logic embeds the notion of justification into a
classical logic propositional framework and therefore it also exploits the char-
acteristic semantic treatment of related epistemic notions such as common and
distributed knowledge. Secondly, it entirely misses the notion of dependent con-
struction that is typical of the predicative format of Intuitionistic Type Theory
and which is here exploited to define trust relations syntactically. Finally, and
precisely on the basis of the previous point, it does not allow a polymorphic lan-
guage as the one we will present in the next section, which allows us to define
at the same time a stronger and a weaker epistemic state, and to characterize
trusted communications as a relation among the two.
In section 7 we shall refer extensively to the large number of other formal
approaches that deal with the issue of trust and we will see how the greatest
part of this literature presents semantic approaches, mostly pivoted on the use
of Kripke semantics for modal logics. In the following, we will introduce one
syntactic approach which we believe is worth exploring on its own. As explained
6This latter logical requirement induces a further difficulty with respect to real-based sit-
uations: the trustor behaves as a complete ignorant with respect to the trustee’s verification,
which puts the relation of trusted communication among scientists from related areas on a
par with the same relation between an expert and a layman. The trustor needs in both cases
to show additional competences in order to be able to reconstruct the verification initially
grounding the trustee’s information. This may be practically difficult to attain in the case of
trusted communications between an expert and a layman. Nonetheless, from a logical point
of view, admissibility of a proof-object at each index is a formal requirement that guarantees
proofs are canonical.
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above, it gives a fine-grained analysis of the relation between agent and content,
making it possible to distinguish among different epistemic states. In doing so,
it proves well-behaving in analyzing interesting properties for communication
acts. Most importantly, our language is already in predicative form, whereas
other semantic treatments mostly deal with propositional languages. Finally, it
presents the advantage that it can be easily interpreted into machine-language
via a translation to a procedural semantics, as mentioned in section 7 . More-
over, we do not know of any other formal treatment that so explicitly connects
to the literature in epistemology for the problem of testimony under the read-
ing we are proposing, where an act of testimony is understood as a first-order
relation of communication characterized by the second order property of trust.
3. A Type Theory for Multi-Agents Epistemic Processes
The constructive version of type theory (CTT)7 admits objects as construc-
tors defining types, hence the semantics entirely relies on the syntax of the
language. In this paper, the standard syntax of CTT is extended as to ac-
commodate indices on terms and variables constructors. Sets of indexed term
constructors ai, bj , . . . and variable constructors xi, yj , . . . are used, so that each
is a constructor for an appropriate type A,B, . . . and i, j ∈ G range over an
enumerable set G of distinct sources or agents. We call these indices the signa-
tures of the sources. Our types are propositions and each type is justified by a
source-dependent construction, i.e. a signed construction. A message can always
be taken to be passed from an agent to herself, as she trust her own assumption
to formulate a given expression. In this case the expression contains only one
index, G reduces to a singleton and the language to the mono-modal case.
An indexed term constructor ai for type A is intended as the verification
with signature (issued by source or agent) i that makes A a justified claim. The
type-theoretic formula ai :A can be understood as expressing that a type A is
presented with a name a for its proof-variable signed by its issuer i. Computa-
tionally, this corresponds to a term for which usual α-conversion applies. It will
be ensured later on by the modal extension of the system that proof terms are
treated as canonical within a group of signatures.
An indexed variable constructor xi for a type A is intended as the consis-
tently admissible but unverified claim of the truth A with signature (issued by
source or agent) i. The type-theoretic formula xi :A can be understood as ex-
pressing that a type A is admitted or assumed by agent i: the computational
explanation of this notion of assumption is based on a proof-variable for which
no appropriate substitution is executed, but admissible. As this implies that a
β-redex for A is possible, then by definition we are working with formulas that
are not in normal form and with non-canonical terms. Also this property will
be expressible by an appropriate modal extension of the language.
A single non-atomic formula can be obtained by distinctly signed terms
or variable constructors. This happens according to two distinct cases, each
involving one of the atomic types of the language. Where a formula is categorical
and constructed out of proof-constructors ai, bj , it will be possible to sign it
7See [49, 50]; see also [59] for an introduction oriented towards computer scientists and [62]
for a more logico-philosophical perspective.
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by either i or j, or both. Where a variable xi is involved in a dependent
construction performed under signature j, the obtained formula will be signed by
both signatures i, j, but not separately. To express these properties, the modal
extension of the language will apply to contextual judgements as well, inducing
the definition of modal contexts and leading to appropriate counterparts of
Common and Distributed Knowledge.8
3.1. The non-modal fragment for functional information
Let us start by defining the non-modal fragment of our language and giving
it a sensible interpretation. Our alphabet is built by introducing the kinding:
Definition 3 (The set of kinds). The set K of kinds includes two sets:
K := {(A,B, . . . type); (A,B, . . . typeinf )}
where type is the kind of all justified knowledge claims defined by term construc-
tors, and typeinf is the kind of all communicable information chunks defined by
variable constructors. Elements of typeinf can be used to define elements in
type.
The objects in K are next defined via the set of terms:
Definition 4 (The set of terms). The set of terms T = {C,V} is given by the
set of constructors for terms
C := {ai; (ai, bj); ai(bj);λ(ai(bj));<ai, bj>};
and the set of variables for terms
V := {xi; (xi(bj)); (xi(bj))(ai)}.
So terms can be respectively:
• ai an inhabitant or constructor of our basic kind type;
• (ai, bj) a pair of constructors;
• ai(bj) an application of constructors;
• λ(ai(bj)) an abstraction of constructors;
• <ai, bj> and ordered pair of constructors;
• xi a constructor for our basic kind typeinf ;
• (xi(bj)) an abstraction of a variable w.r.t. a constructor;
8The formal treatment of contextual reasoning and the dynamics of contexts originating in
natural deduction calculi and inherited in the stronger format of constructive logic embedded
in Martin-Lo¨f’s Type Theory is further analyzed in its natural language interpretation in [67].
The multi-contextual approach underlying our model recalls well-known research in Artificial
Intelligence, see [51],[29], [30], which eventually led to the propositional logic and first-order
logic of context, see [15], [14]; [68] provides a general method for designing multi-contextual
logics with agents. Recently a newly formulated semantics for constructive contextual K has
been given in [53].
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• (xi(bj))(ai) the application of an abstracted variable to a type constructor.
Two remarks are needed here: first, variables in this language are not just
abstractions from term constructors, rather separate terms on their own to
construct the kind of typeinf ; second, as our modalities are purely judgemental,
T does not contain modal terms, as it is the case with other systems.9 We now
look at contexts.
Definition 5 (Contexts). A context is the set of assumptions under which a
given constructor can be formulated. We construct contexts in the following
way:
1. A type-theoretic expression xi : A is an assumption with xi ∈ T and
A typeinf ; an assumption is the declaration that a source or agent i as-
sumes an admissible construction for type A, which is then declared to be
true.
2. A context Γ is a finite sequence of assumptions {xi :A, . . . , xn :N}, all with
distinct subjects. Each assumption in Γ depends on previous assumptions
in the same context, i.e. each xi :α depends on the assumptions from x1 :α
up to xi−1 :α, where α stands for a metavariable in K.
3. If Γ = {xi : A, . . . , xn : N}, an extended context ∆ = {Γ, xn+1 : N + 1}
corresponds to ∆ = {xi : A, . . . , xn+1 : N + 1}. When the declaration
of a freshly introduced variable xn+1 :N + 1 is meant to be independent
of the order of declarations in Γ, we introduce it following a separation
sign as follows: Γ | xn+1 : N + 1. A judgement dependent on a context
of assumptions J [xi : A, . . . , xn : N ], means that J type holds given the
substitution [xi/ai :α] of each xi with a certain ai in α.
Standardly, contexts Γ = {x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An} are built according to the
requirement that wants the list of expressions in contexts to contain all distinct
subjects. The structure of contexts in our language differs in the obvious sense
that expressions with variables contained in a context are now made distinct by
their signature from the set T . Hence, we cannot just ensure that all signatures
are different, because one single signature might be attached to different contents
in the same context. We require instead explicitly the use of distinct elements
in K for each expression in a context.10
We extend now our syntax with semantic judgements, considering two dis-
tinct truth predicates induced by our kinds:
Definition 6 (Semantic Judgements for K). The kinding K induces truth defi-
nitions as follows:
ai :A
Truth Definition
A true
A typeinf xi :A
Hypothetical Truth Definition
A true∗
9See e.g. the languages presented in [56], [55].
10This in turn implies the simplification that wants redundant information to be avoided
within a context.
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3.2. Axioms and Rules for type
Let us analyze the rules for this non-modal fragment of our language. Typing
for the first element in K gives the first basic axiom of the system:
Definition 7 (Axiom for type). ` type :K.
We need now to explain how to construct objects within the kind type
based on constructions by signed terms ai, bj . Within this kind, we have a
few construction steps: what is usually functional abstraction reduces to ap-
plication; generalization by ∀-introduction and specification by ∃-introduction
are restricted to enumerable constructors and without abstraction; a negation
introduction is admissible by type checking on the enumerable constructions.
The standard start rule is reformulated as a rule to introduce a premise; usual
structural rules are easily defined for this fragment.
Definition 8 (Rules for type). The rules for signed expressions in the kind type
are:
ai :A
Type Formation
A type
ai :A bj :B
I∧
(ai, bj) :A ∧B
ai :A A true ` bj :B
I →
ai(bj) :A→ B
a1 :A, . . . , an :A A true ` bj :B λ((ai(bj))A,B)
I∀
(∀ai :A)B type
a1 :A, . . . , an :A ai :A ` bj :B (< ai, bj >,A,B)
I∃
(∃ai :A)B type
ai :A
I⊥¬A→ ⊥
Premise Rule
Γ, ai :A,∆ ` A true.
Γ ` B type Γ ` A type
Weakening
Γ | ai :A ` B type.
Γ | ai :A, bj :B ` C type Γ ` bj :B
Contraction
Γ | ai :A ` C type.
Γ | ai :A, bj :B ` C type
Exchange
Γ | bj :B, ai :A ` C type
The structural rules can be interpreted as follows, with Γ,∆ possibly empty
contexts. The Premise Rule corresponds to a Global Validity Rule: if the truth
of A is generated at source i by verification, its validity is global to the relevant
G to which i belongs. This property is obviously crucial to induce the desired
canonical proof-terms, and important to validate the other structural rules.
Weakening says that the external addition of a premise to the context of a truth
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is possible (but ineffective with respect to its value). Contraction says that if a
context Γ includes a premise at an external source j, then what holds for Γ and
the external premise at j, holds at Γ. Exchange says that the order of external
premises is not relevant (whereas it will be for assumptions in a context, under
the fragment for typeinf ). Notice that the validity of Weakening, Contraction
and Exchange is restricted to external premises, i.e. for additional sources not
within a context but attached to a context, for which we use the separator |
after the contexts. This is because by Definition 5, assumptions in a context
come with a strict order relation, such that each element depends on previous
ones: this imposes that addition or exchange of premises do not interfere with
such order.
3.3. Axioms and Rules for typeinf
The new inhabitant for our kinding, namely typeinf , requires specific typing
and formation rules, based on our notion of legal assumption. We state the
ability of a user or source i ∈ G to generate a legal assumption for A whenever
in the enumerable set of multi-indexed constructions available to G, no dec-
laration A → ⊥ is construed. The weak constructive nature of this principle
recalls Kolmogorov’s notion of pseudo-truth introduced in [43]. The admissibil-
ity rule for the typeinf sort interprets the distinction between intensionality and
extensionality of types, treated e.g. explicitly in [60]: expressions are treated in-
tensionally being subject only to α-conversion; terms are treated extensionally,
being additionally subject to β and η-conversion.11
Definition 9 (Axiom for typeinf ). ` typeinf :K.
Constructors for typeinf are restricted to interpret the function formation
rule. The construction for typeinf is based on a missing refutation for the corre-
sponding type, i.e. it is configured as double negation introduction, without elim-
ination. The β-conversion rule expresses substitution of an open variable with a
value constructor, i.e. it constructs an appropriate value for a non-contradicting
assumption, representing the reduction to type. An α-conversion rule expresses
substitution, by the obvious inductive definition, of an instance of value con-
structor for a signed variable on a finite domain of equivalent constructors,
constructing a function among those defining a class of dependent types.
Definition 10 (Rules for typeinf ). The rules for signed expressions in the kind
typeinf are:
¬(A→ ⊥) type
Typeinf Formation
A typeinf
11The Lax modality defined in a propositional intuitionistic logic in [23] has also similar
properties: the modal formula ◦φ expresses the inhabitation of φ in the context of a number of
assumptions holding in a stronger theory; the theory designs two distinct and dual contexts:
one where the formula is true only in certain worlds where appropriate constraints hold, the
other only where constraints are false. The former is the partial element lifting and the latter
the exception lifting for the type formula φ at hand. See [23, p.65]. Our double-negated
typing might be seen as a way of admitting the first kind of constraints, up to proving that
the second kind holds.
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A typeinf bj :B[xi :A]
Functional abstraction
((xi)bj) :A ⊃ B true
A typeinf bj :B[xi :A] ai :A
β-conversion
(x(bj))(ai) = b[a/x] :B type[a/x]
λ((a1−i(bj))A,B) (bj)[ai := a]
α− conversion
(ai(bj)) :A→ B
Hypothesis Rule
Γ, xi :A,∆ ` A true∗
Γ ` B typeinf xi :A ` A typeinf
Weakening
Γ | xi :A ` B typeinf .
Γ | xi :A, yj :B ` C typeinf Γ ` yj :B
Contraction
Γ | xi :A ` C typeinf
Γ | xi :A | yj :B ` C typeinf
Exchange
Γ | yj :B | xi :A,` C typeinf
The structural rules can be interpreted as follows. The Hypothesis Rule
is a Local Validity Rule: if the truth of A depends on a legal assumption at
source i, its validity is bound (starred) to that point in G, until discharged (by
β-conversion). Weakening says that the addition of a legal hypothesis external
to the context of a starred truth is possible (but ineffective with respect to its
value). Contraction says that if a context Γ includes a legal assumption at source
j, then what holds for Γ and the explicit external formulation of the assumption
at j, holds at Γ. Exchange says that the order of external assumptions is not
relevant. Notice that in this case, validity of the structural rules is restricted to
assumptions that are not in a relation order within a context (presence of the
context separator in the Exchange Rule).
3.4. The multi-modal fragment: reasoning about collective knowledge
The aim of the present section is to introduce modal operators in order to
generalize the formulation of available judgements. From the Definition 5 of
context and the construction of our alphabet, modalities are defined on the ba-
sis of the different kinds. If all subformulae in a dependent expression have the
same index, our language reduces to the mono-modal polymorphic type theory
presented in [65]. Otherwise, the machinery for a multi-modal language needs to
be developed, with the further complication of determining if the modalities in-
volved are all definable within the same language (in other words, if the language
is homogeneous or heterogeneous). With the multi-modalities, derivability in
context generates different forms of collective knowledge of a judgement J under
a multi-modal context Σ.
We start from considering a judgement Γ ` J . The validity of J depending
on the (ordered) list of assumptions in Γ formalizes an assumption-based rea-
soning process from declarations generated by multiple agents {i, . . . , n} ∈ G
all occurring in Γ. Ordering the declarations in Γ expresses the fact that these
14
are not independent typing declarations, rather there is a strict order relation
among signed assumptions.12 We are therefore describing the structure of a
process in which each agent i communicates a message φ that another agent j
lower in the list (i < j) takes as a reliable message. Each such communication
is expressed as the function that makes φ valid at j provided it is valid at i.
When the communication involves more that one content φ or more than two
agents i < j < k, we express the state at k dependently from the extension of a
context Γi by a context ∆j .
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Whereas in standard modal logics, operators are defined by the correspond-
ing accessibility relations on worlds; we induce them from the (local) validity of
hypotheses, simulating update on epistemic conditions from the validity of some
propositional truth. The basic idea is to express the validity of a proposition
within such context, and to use modalities to define the possible extension of
such validity under accessibility of other contexts: necessity is explained as va-
lidity in all contexts and possibility as validity in some contexts. The role of the
accessibility relation among contexts is played by a context extension function,
which can be seen as a form of contextual weakening:14
Γ ` A true
Context Extension
Γ | ∆ ` A true
The justification of the main judgement A true determines if all or some contexts
∆ extending the relevant context Γ are valid, where both Γ,∆ can be taken to
be empty. In the first case, if any ∆ extending a context Γ preserves A true,
it means Γ ` a :A holds and eventually Γ = ∅. This holds provided that: (1)
according to Definition 5, any declaration in Γ has its corresponding β-redex
and so it is in normal form; and (2) no non-monotonic extension by a typeinf
term is possible with respect to constructors in Γ. In the second case, if A true
is valid under some non-empty Γ containing typeinf expressions, only some of
the extensions of the latter context will keep the judgement A true valid. In
this sense, the weakening
Γ ` A true∗
Local Context Extension
Γ | ∆ ` A true
is possible iff ∆ provides no redex falsifying some (xi : α) ∈ Γ. This means
that the extension by a predicate true∗ is not necessarily monotonic, and hence
the inference holds under some but not all context extensions. This explana-
tion gives the following Definition of simple or global contextual validity under
extension:
12The counterpart strategy amounts to collecting distinct and equally ordered indexed con-
texts (eventually singletons), when we want to express that the different sources are not
prioritized. This is the strategy pursued for the mono-modal version in [65].
13Our model simulates a reliable message delivery systems, see [24], where for each agent
holding a content true there is an effective communication chain towards her (but in our case
not necessarily from her), meaning that for each content that is known, it is also transmitted.
We shall further develop this analogy, in particular to show the holding of properties involved
by the usual definitions of Common and Distributed Knowledge.
14In a comparison with the standard modal explanation, one would say that the validity of
A is indistinguishable from the point of view of contexts Γ and ∆.
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Definition 11 (Validity under contextual extension). A type A derivable in a
context Γ | ∆ holds as follows:
1. the judgement J = A true is justified by [xi/ai] : A in context Γ, i.e.
its construction is in normal form in Γ and it remains valid under any
extension Γ | ∆; then A is said to be globally valid under Γ | ∆;
2. the judgement J = A true∗ is justified by xi : A in context Γ, i.e. its
construction contains all needed open variables but is not in normal form
in Γ or in some extension Γ | ∆; then A is said to be locally valid under
Γ | ∆.
The notion of global validity holds obviously for categorical judgements as
special cases of contextual global validity under empty contexts: by definition
with Γ = ∅, it holds that ∅ ` A true ⇒ Γ ` A true, for any Γ. The context
extension operation allows for mimicking syntactically the notion of accessibility
on worlds, so that judgemental modal operators express that a proof holds
somewhere or everywhere, with respect to contexts.15
We inherit now modal judgements from indexed constructors, to express
single-agent modes of validity:
Definition 12 (Modal Judgements). The set of modal judgements M for any
i ∈ G is defined by the following modal formation rules:
ai :A − Formation
i(A true)
xi :A ♦− Formation
♦i(A true)
The meaning of these expressions is the following: i(A true) says that if
A is true by a verification (constructor in normal form) generated by source i,
then it will be valid with respect to any context accessible from i (i.e. under
any context that extends the empty context of i); ♦i(A true) says that if A is
declared true by a legal assumption (constructor in non-normal form) generated
by source i, then it will be locally valid with respect to some context accessible
from i. We want now to make explicit this hidden reference to contextually
accessible modal judgements:
Definition 13 (Signed and Modal Contexts). A signed modal context is con-
strued as follows:
1. If all declarations in context Γ are signed by index i, we indicate it as
Γi = {xi : A, . . . , xi : N} (where all subjects {A, . . . , N} ∈ typeinf are
distinct);
2. Given an expression xi : A by the Rule of ♦-Formation we obtain the
expression ♦i(A true), which declares that A is a type valid for some
extension of context Γi;
3. Given a construction ai available for the explicit substitution [xi/ai] : A
by the Rule of -Formation we obtain the expression i(A true), which
declares that A is a type valid for any extension of context Γi;
15Our distinction between terms and modal operators is technically the same distinction
that it is obtained in [55] by distinguishing between variables for different kind of hypotheses
and labels to refer to locations of such constructors. We can directly use modalities because we
define them as judgement rather than propositional operators, hence they apply to processes
rather than to specifications.
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4. For any context Γi, if there is at least one A ∈ Γ such that ♦i(A true),
we infer ♦iΓ;
5. For any context Γi, if for all A ∈ Γ it holds i(A true), we infer iΓ;
By the first clause in this definition, a signed context Γi behaves like a
standard context where all declarations are generated at the same source; by the
second and the third clause each declaration in a context Γi can be transformed
in the appropriate modal counterpart by the corresponding modal Formation
rule; by the fourth clause a context containing all boxed assumptions becomes
a boxed context; by the fifth clause the presence of a locally valid assumption
makes the corresponding context a locally valid one.
3.5. Extension to Multi-modalities
Now that definitions for modal contexts with a unique index have been
formulated, each context can be defined further by allowing differently indexed
modalities to interact with one another. This is obtained by extending a signed
(modal) context ◦Γi in view of a differently signed (modal) context ◦∆j . This
extension is meant to allow judgements of the form
(1) ♦GΓ ` ♦k(A true)
(2) GΓ ` k(A true)
where G={i, . . . , j} and j < k. The modal dependency defined by these formu-
las allows for different interpretations: formulas of the type (1) say that “A is a
message accepted as true by agent k, trusting the information Γ received from
agent i to agent j ∈ G”, where i ≤ j ≤ k is a strict order relation; formulas of
the type (2) rely on actual verification of the involved contextual formulae, re-
sulting in an epistemic expression where the trust relation is no longer necessary.
We shall consider which of the typical bridging axioms for normal multi-modal
logics fit best the composition of such two interpretations.
In the first place we have to define the construction rule for ◦GΓ, where
◦ = {,♦}. The role of contexts is primarily that of formalizing information
communication acts and the inner order of their structure simulates the strict
order relation of trust among agents. The modalities prefixing a context will dic-
tate the nature of any epistemic state valid under such a context. A consistency
constraint is intuitively satisfied as follows: it is impossible for an extension
iΓ | ◦j∆ to be such that i(A true) holds and the extension xj : A → ⊥
being admitted; ♦iΓ | ◦j∆ allows instead any extension by definition of typeinf
present in Γ. (Here and in the following Γ,∆ are always sets, whereas Σ is
always a multiset and J on the right-hand side of the derivability relation is
meant to be a place holder for any derivable judgement of the form (A true).)
Definition 14 (Extension of Signed and Modal Contexts). An extended signed
modal context is construed as follows:
1. A multi-modal context Σi,j is a context extension
◦iΓ | ◦j∆ = {◦i(A true), . . . , ◦i(N true), ◦j(O true)};
where ◦ = {;♦} and the set of signatures used in Σi,j are abbreviated as
ΣG;
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2. A context extension ◦iΓ | ◦j∆ is admissible if, for any judgement J ∈∆
such that J=A typeinf , Γ 0 (A→ ⊥);
3. A multi-modal context ΣG is prefixed by an appropriate multi-modal oper-
ator G or ♦G following appropriate counterparts of instruction items 4
and 5 of Definition 13;
4. The type-theoretic expression ♦GΣ ` J is thus obtained by
iΓ | ♦j∆ ` J
and it expresses the local validity of J from source i and j by information
available at source j accessed from source i; the content of J remains
unverified, and hence refutable, at some further point k;
5. The type-theoretic expression GΣ ` J is thus obtained by
iΓ | j∆ ` J
and it expresses the global validity of J from source i and j, in view of
the information that source j makes available when accessed from source
i; the content of J remains verified, hence irrefutable, at any further point
k.
By this definition, a multi-modal context is the extension of mono-modal
contexts (given eventually by singletons) with an accordingly modified signature.
The informal reading of the formula ◦iΓ | ◦j∆ is that a communication process
about information contained in J happens from the agent or source i to agent
or source j, for i ≤ j ∈ G.
We can now define modal derivability from multi-modal contexts, i.e. where
now we admit a context to include an enumerable number of distinct signatures
G = {1, . . . n}:16
Definition 15 (Modal Judgements from multi-signed contexts). Modal judge-
ments are derived from multi-modal signed contexts according to the following
cases:
• k(A true) iff for all Γj ∈ Context, ∅ | jΓ ` k(A true), where j =⋃{1, . . . , k − 1} ∈ G;
• ♦k(A true) iff for some Γi,∆j ∈ Context, iΓ | ♦j∆ ` ♦k(A true), where
j =
⋃{1, . . . , k − 1} ∈ G;
Our next aim is to evaluate multi-modal contextual derivations and to ex-
plore the resulting properties. It will be shown how evaluation on information
communicated under trust results in knowledge formation (common and dis-
tributed).
16Indices for agents can be compared intuitively to different states in a Kripke semantics.
The context extension function works as a domain inclusion assumption in relational Kripke
structures: if M = (S, pi, k1, . . . , kn) is such a structure and (s, t) ∈ ki, according to the
domain inclusion assumption dom(pi(s)) ⊆ dom(pi(t)), i.e. one assumes that if the state t is
connected from s, then the domain corresponding to s is a subset of the domain corresponding
to t, Cf. [24, pp.86–87]. Under this analogy, a context extension produces a subset of the
overall domain on which evaluations are performed and the formula ◦iΓ | ◦j∆ says that the
contents in ∆ are accessible from those in Γ, where the properties of such accessibility shall
depend on the configuration given by ◦i and ◦j .
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4. From reliable Communication to Knowledge
The interpretation of modal derivability for our type-theoretic language in
terms of reliable communication and knowledge will start by considering first
the properties for the epistemic operation of communication of (unverified, func-
tional) information constrained by the hierarchy of agents. Then we shall con-
sider how to bridge this system with the additional properties obtained by per-
forming verification. Finally, we will see which properties survive the upgrade
to knowledge.
4.1. Properties of Trusted Communication
The weaker epistemic state involved in the process of communication corre-
sponds in the type-theoretic setting to the use of open (refutable) judgements
xi :A in a dependent judgement. Such formula admits the inference to the ♦i
operator by the modal formation rule in Definition 12. The informal mean-
ing of the ♦-Formation rule is therefore that if A is admissible in the system,
then someone has information about A. Notice that, being generated from the
weaker true∗ predicate, this rule keeps reliability separated from alethic proper-
ties, whence validity is not guaranteed. Informally, this tells us that acceptance
of contents is based on the trust relation among agents, without implying global
truth of the communicated messages.17 In the case of G = {1}, we have the
admissibility of the formula
Autonomous Hypothesis Rule
Γ, xi :A,∆ ` ♦i(A true)
This rule expresses the basic property that agents trust themselves on admissible
contents.18 This rule can be generalized under hypotheses to admit a form of
Reflexivity :
xi :A ` A true∗
Reflexivity
Γ, xi :A,∆ ` ♦i(A true)
With G = {1, . . . , n}, n > 1, the basic requirement is that communications
happen in a strictly ordered way, from higher to lower positions in the trust
hierarchy. Under this proviso, a communication formula xi :A is always taken
to hold in the context of information generated at Γi−1.
In the following, we shall abbreviate any formula of the form (A true) by
J , followed by indices J ′, J ′′, . . . when we want to refer to distinct contents
(A,B, . . .) ∈ K. In turn, any modal judgement ◦i∈G(A true) | ◦ = {,♦} will
be abbreviated by ◦iJ . In order to express the admissibility of B at signature
j based on trusting A true at signature i and i < j we shall use the abbrevi-
ated format ♦j(B true)[♦i(A true)], further simplified as ♦kJ [♦iJ ′]. Whenever
the content is intended to be the same, we shall of course drop the index on
judgements. Now we can use this simplified notation to define our notion of
communication chain:
17This rule goes via the inference xi :A⇒ A true∗ ⇒ ♦i(A true), generating a weaker form
of the ‘vigilance’ property suggested in [21]. As we shall see later on, the true predicate, on
the other hand, enforces communication of true messages.
18This is a basic weaker counterpart of ‘sincerity’ than what is admitted in [21].
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Definition 16 (Communication Chain). For every message ♦J and agents
G = {i < k}, either ♦kJ [♦iJ ] and k = j, or there is a j such that G = {i <
j < k} and ♦kJ [♦jJ [♦iJ ]]. We call the hierarchical relation between i, j, k ∈ G
a Communication Chain where ♦kJ relies on ♦jJ , which relies on ♦iJ .
By this definition every communication is unidirectional (going top-down in
the trust hierarchy) and compact (meaning that messages are communicated
among all agents present in the hierarchy).19 We can now use the notion of
Communication Chain and its structure to unveil the Definition of Trusted
Communication, which is our formal counterpart to the definition of Testimony
given in Definition 2:
Definition 17 (Trusted Communication). We say that a Trusted Communi-
cation is a ternary relation TC = 〈♦i,♦j , J〉, i < j ∈ G, holding between the
epistemic state of the sender, that we indicate by the corresponding modal atti-
tude expressed by ♦i, the epistemic state of the receiver, equivalently indicated
by the corresponding modal attitude expressed by ♦j, and a content J . A TC is
then enforced by a Communication Chain of the form ♦jJ [♦iJ ] and xi :A ` ♦iJ .
The first and second element in the ternary relation are the epistemic states
of the trustor and of the trustee towards the content of J . This third element in
the relation enforced by TC can be of course composed by distinct judgements
J, J ′ when J ` J ′. A generalization of this definition enforcing relations among
sets of trustors and trustees can be given by defining identity over agents, start-
ing from equality rules of contents defined over the corresponding derivability
relations: agents i and j enforce the same set of TCs with respect to another
agent k and a content J iff the derivability relations indexed by i and k produce
the same set of judgements as that indexed by j and k. 20
By the definition of Communication Chain, a form of (ordered) Transitivity
called Transmission is enforced:
xi :A ` A true∗ ♦j(B true)[♦i(A true)] ♦k(B true)[♦j(B true)]
Transmission
♦i(A true) ` ♦k(B true)
It says that if Agent k trusts Agent j on J and Agent j holds J trusting
Agent i on J ′, then Agent k will also consider Agent i trustworthy on J ′ (for
(i < j < k ∈ G)). An example of this property on the trust relation can be
formulated as follows: a patient (agent k) trusts her doctor (agent j) to provide
correct medical information and diagnosis (J); agent j holds J because she
trusts his studies (agent i) to have provided accurate information about how to
formulate diagnoses; then (though indirectly) agent k trusts agent i to provide
accurate information about how to formulate diagnoses.21
19As we focus on a delivery system, i.e. on the message from the point of view of the receiver,
we cannot grant that every message sent is successfully received.
20The restriction enforced by considering an occurrence of trust between two agents with
respect to a content, perfectly endorses the definition of trust relationship at runtime for
information systems given in [76], where also the generalization to sets of agents is presented.
21We model this property having in mind its semantic counterpart: the difference between
Transmission and Transitivity is that whereas the former is of the form KaKbp → Kap, the
latter takes the form Kap → KbKap, with a, b in the set of Agents and p a propositional
content of information. [38, sec. 4.2] uses the term ‘Transmissibility’ to refer to such a
20
Obviously, we do not want to admit that a trusted communication be re-
versible in the order of the signatures, to avoid the validity of expressions of the
following form: “If Agent j considers B true by trusting Agent i on the truth
of A, then Agent i considers A true by trusting Agent j on the truth of B”.
Hence Symmetry for such a relation is not admitted, in other words a trusted
communication is a uni-directional relation.22 In this way, our trust relation is
transitive only towards sources, but not towards receivers.
The epistemic value of functional information as admissible (but unverified)
content should be preserved under locally valid modal contexts. This means
that from a multi-context ♦GΣ one infers possibility judgements. This validates
the following rules:
Definition 18 (Rules for ♦GΣ). The set of rules for working within a multi-
modal context ♦GΣ are of the following form:
Γi | xj :A ` B true∗
multiple I♦
♦GΣ ` ♦i,j(B true)
iΓ | ♦j∆ ` ♦i,j(A true) ♦j∆, xk :A ` ♦j,k(B true)
multiple E♦
Γi | ∆j ` B true∗
The first rule is an instance of substitution of declarations within contexts
with modal assumptions: by extending the (either global or local) Γi with in-
formation accessible locally at source j, the judgement (B true) is prefixed by
♦i,j , meaning these sources are always to be called upon for the validity of B
(i.e. B holds at their intersection). The corresponding elimination starts from
a similarly derivable judgement ♦i,j(A true) to infer its variable constructor
(which needs to be located) and to obtain a well-formed ♦j,k(B true), then it
infers that the initial conditions Γi | ∆j suffice to derive the local validity of B
(without the additional location of A). The multiplicity condition means that
equivalent operations need to be performed within Γi,∆j where necessary.
We can now reconnect these inference rules for ♦ with the notion of Trusted
Communication as given by Definition 17 in order to relate trusted information
to derivable contents:
property of communication. ‘Transmission’ is also used in the literature on the epistemology
of testimony, for instance [45] uses “transmission of epistemic properties” as a label for several
theories of testimony. Notice that the transitivity of trust only applies to identical tokens of
information (in this case J ′), which guarantees that – in the previous example – agent i
is trusted only with respect to the communication of J ′ and not with respect to any other
instance of information she may hold. This is a most needed property, which is formally
secured by the fact that the transmissions are defined by dependencies of content generated by
agents. Trust is then the property holding between agents instantiating such transmissions.
This means that trust between agents i, j, k is not generalized with respect to any other
information item they might possibly share. Transitivity as the basic property for generation
of trust among unknown entities in information systems is studied in [40].
22To put it in a rough comparison with the model developed in [18], we are not considering
in this formal framework any ‘outputting trust’ relation, that is the relation of trust relating
the process of transmitting knowledge from the knowing to the accepting agent and the trust
that the former has in the latter. Nonetheless, the asymmetric nature of our model can be
avoided in an obvious way, by defining two distinct TC’s reversing the order of the indices in
the first two elements of the triple.
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Definition 19 (Sequenced admissible communication). If ♦lJ [♦iJ ′, . . . ,♦kJn],
we write ♦i,kΣ ` ♦lJ and say that
1. judgement J is reachable at l (k ≤ l ∈ G) from ♦i,kΣ if there are trusted
communications TC1 = 〈♦i, J〉 up to TCn = 〈♦k,♦l, J, Jn〉 such that at
TCk agent l trusts agents k on the content of Jn to infer the content of
J , at TCk−1 agent k trusts agents k − 1 on the content of Jn−1 to infer
the content of Jn and so on up to TC1−k where agent i+ 1 trusts agent i
on the content of J ′ to infer the content of J
′+1, and
2. Σi,k | ♦l∆ is admissible.
The first condition says that an accessible informational content in a multi-
modal context needs to be reachable from a sequence of trusted communications
among the ordered agents. The second condition says that the extension of the
multi-modal context by the communicated information needs to be admissible.
As a lemma, we obtain that trusted communication leads to admissibility:
Lemma 1 (Admissibility via Trusted Communication). Given ♦i,kΣ ` ♦lJ , for
G = {i < j < k} and TC = 〈♦i, . . . ,♦k, J〉,
1. either Γi,k | ∆j is admissible, or
2. there are judgements 〈♦jJ ′, . . . ,♦kJn〉 such that TC1 = 〈♦i,♦j , Jj〉 up to
TCn−1 = 〈♦j ,♦k, Jk〉 and ♦lJ [♦jJ ′, . . . ,♦kJn].
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the length of the propositional contents
(A, . . . , N) ∈ Σ:
• k = 1 is satisfied by the Autonomous Hypothesis Rule, which also shows
the two conditions to be not exclusive.;
• where k > 1, there are at least k− 1 steps in trusted communication such
that at the latter of these steps ♦lJ becomes admissible in view of the
multi-modal context Σj,k. Each such step will consist of any of the rules
for typeinf such that the construction of ♦j,kΣ is preserved.23
4.2. Bridging Properties
The β-conversion rule listed for the typeinf kind is the syntactical rule that
enforces verification of communicated information, giving the bridge from pos-
sibility to necessity contexts. Going in the other direction, a modal version of
abstraction on terms expresses communication of verified information, giving
the bridge from necessity to possibility contexts. This shows the basic interac-
tion between the two forms of modal judgements that can be generated from
type and typeinf formulae. We list in the following the properties resulting from
admitting this bridging among the two modalities.
Let us start from the latter case, obtained by the following ♦-import rule:
23Notice that Definition 19 and Lemma 1 gives for our system what the Definition of reacha-
bility in asynchronous message passing systems and Lemma 4.5.2 give for message transmission
in [24, p.146].
22
iΓ, aj :A ` i,j(B true) xj :A ` A true∗ ♦ Import
iΓ,♦j(A true) ` ♦i,j(B true)
justified by an instance of the Hypothesis Rule and ♦ Formation. It says that
starting from ai :A, one is allowed to infer xi :A, or in other words that each
content derivable from an agent’s state can always be formulated in the weaker
informational state of the same agent.24 If we force the order relation to work in
the rule and use accessibility to a new state in the first premise, we can provide
an instance of the ♦-import rule that satisfies Common Seriality:
iΓ, aj :A ` k(B true) xj :A ` A true∗
Common Seriality
iΓ,♦j(A true) ` ♦k(B true)
The intuitive meaning of Common Seriality is that each agent’s knowledge (con-
clusion of the first premise) can be traced back to some agent’s information (sec-
ond premise and conclusion). Note that by Definition 16 where reflexivity holds,
this does not need to imply an infinite chain. This intuitively refers to the path
of trusted communications that links together the agents in the hierarchy.25
The modal version of β-conversion is here reformulated as -Import:
Γi, xj :A ` B true∗ aj :A ` A true − Import
iΓ, aj :A ` i,j(B true)
obtained by an instance of the Premise Rule and -Formation.
If we look at the modal import rules, we obtain a description of our agents
as informees consistent with their knowledge and knowers consistent with their
verified informations. Notice that information reduces to knowledge only pro-
vided that for every fresh variable constructor xi of the typeinf on a ♦-import
rule, a new application of the β-conversion rule is formulated such that the
corresponding B typeinf in its second premise is reduced to its normal form
B type and in the conclusion every occurrence of ♦i,j(B true) is reduced to
i,j(B true).
To interpret the transmission of epistemic contents among distinct agents,
we enforce a rule for communication of known contents corresponding to con-
vergence:
iΓ ` A true ♦j(A true)[xi :A]
Convergence
iΓ, xi :A ` ♦j(A true)
Informally, this rule says that if there is a knowledge obtained at i and j is
informed about that (for the usual i < j and using Common Seriality), then
at i it is known that j is informed about that. Convergence satisfies Semi-
Adjunction (or Seriality, for the mono-modal B) as an instance, which means
that the condition expressed by Convergence is strictly stronger than Common
24Hence, it provides a counterpart to the model-theoretic D axiom scheme α→ ♦α
25The relation between trusting agents and the occurrence of communication analyzed in
[21] implements a cooperativity axiom that forces each belief content to be communicated
among trusting agents. From our Common Seriality Rule a much more reasonable property is
obtained: where knowledge has been achieved in the context of trusting agents, communication
has been performed.
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Seriality, as it implies that knowledge is communicated and that communications
are known: if something is known to be communicated, then each agent knows
that those lower in the trust hierarchy are informed about it. Convergence
ensures the transparency of the system, as it allows all the agents to know what
content has been communicated and at what level of the hierarchy.
4.3. Properties of Knowledge
The validity of truth from  was already established by the Truth Defini-
tion in Definition 6, which implements an equivalent of (standard) Axiom T ,
preserving Reflexivity, saying that any verified A is valid and hence admissible
in any context. In this case trust does no longer occur, as the receiving agent
accepts a content A as true on the basis of its verification. Hence, in our model
truth of contents is independent from the trust in the sender.
We rely on the basic property instantiated by the first item in Definition 15,
according to which k(A true) is derivable from ∅ | jΓ and hence Γj | ∆k is
admissible for ∆ = {k(A true)}. This definition implies the validity of (A true)
at any point in G, which establishes modal derivability under verification:
Definition 20 (Rules for GΣ). The set of rules for working within a modal
context GΣ are of the following form:
Γi | xj :A ` A true∗ iΓ, [xj/aj ] :A ` A true
multiple I
GΣ ` G(A true)
iΓ | aj :A ` i,j(A true) G(A true) | k∆ ` G(B true)
multiple E
Γi | aj :A,∆k ` B true
The first rule is an instance of β-conversion followed by I, which explains
how to turn local validity into global validity by instantiation of all premises:
in other words, we require that each term be valid at all sources accessible from
within G. This is the fundamental step towards the elaboration of CK, where all
the known contents are equally accessible from any agent in the system. Notice
that in the base case of Σ = {∅}, this multi-modal rule becomes of the form 0,1,
verifying the Necessitation Rule. The corresponding elimination starts from a
similarly derived G(B true) to decompose its conditions. The multiplicity
condition applies as in the corresponding rule for ♦Σ. This explanation of
knowledge makes the notion of validity of a content A known by some agent
i strictly dependent on data verification that is accessible by i and equally by
any other agent involved in the knowledge process, but completely independent
from any trust relation among those agents.26
By a specific instance of derivability under nΣ, we show the admissibility
of k(A true) by any Γi,∆j ∈ nΣ and i < j < k ∈ G, from which follows
Upper Inclusion, that is accessibility of valid contents at any higher point in G:
26The equivalence of verification for any agent in the same group as the one actually issuing
the proof-term is a necessary requirement to enforce a sensible notion of knowledge and to
avoid that either trusted communications be reduced only to refutable beliefs or a solipsist
turn of the underlying epistemology. This requirement is formally satisfied by α-conversion
and our definition of the  operator.
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GΣ ` k(A true) i,jΣ | ak :A ` G(A true)
Upper Inclusion
GΣ ` i,j(A true)
The intuitive meaning of Upper Inclusion is that if an agent has some verified
knowledge, then every other agent higher in the trust hierarchy knows it. This
is proven by relying on the assumption that locating the source of the proven
content admissibility extends the initial contexts and is accessible directly from
there. The converse Lower Inclusion expresses accessibility of valid contents at
any lower admissible point in G:
iΓ | j∆ ` i,j(A true) i,jΣ ` k(A true)
Lower Inclusion
GΣ ` k(A true)
It establishes the same relation in the reverse order. Even though this might
seem obvious in view of the definition of our  operator, its actual explanation
requires additionally that the lower point considered be in fact accessible, a
requirement satisfied implicitly by the second premise in the rule. This hidden
requirement is to be made explicit on the basis of the communication operation
within knowledge, ensured by Common Seriality from the previous section.
Letting the Inclusion properties follow one another, validity implies admis-
sibility at each point, which in turn says that Equivalence holds:
iΓ ` i(A true)
Equivalence
iΓ | j∆ ` i,j(A true)
to be read both top-down and bottom-up. If we take |G| > 2, we can also
validate a version of Union:
iΓ | j∆ ` k(A true)
Union
GΣ ` i,j,k(A true)
which is again readable in both directions and holds by the required multiple
substitutions of i, j for GΣ in the Inclusion rules and the Compactness property
from Definition 16. Notice that by the multi-modal version of 1,2-Formation,
we can instantiate ordered iteration very easily:
iΓ | j∆ ` k(A true)
Ascending Iteration
GΣ ` k(i,j(A true))
which says that if at k it is known that A is true in the context of reliable sources
i, j, then in the same context it is known at k that A being true is known at
i, j (in other words, anything known at some point is known at that point to be
known at higher points). This is obtained by applying Common Seriality. The
counterpart
iΓ | j∆ ` k(A true)
Descending Iteration
GΣ ` i,j(k(A true))
says that if at k it is known that A is true in the context of reliable sources i, j,
then in the same context it is known at i, j that A is known to be true at k.
This is easily derivable from Convergence and β-reduction.27
27The proof that the present type-theoretic language including both modalities actually
25
5. Distributed and Common Knowledge
The standard intuitive definition of distributed knowledge (DK) from epis-
temic logics says that a group has distributed knowledge of proposition A if the
combined knowledge of agents in the group implies A.28 The basic requirement
is therefore that not every item in the knowledge base is accessible to every
agent involved in the reasoning process and that therefore the deductive closure
is performed ‘outside of the box’ to find what all agents together might know
(the ‘wise man’ knowledge). In the case of knowledge processes based on a
trust relation, in which the trustor justifies a given content relying on the justi-
fication of some other content accessible only to the trustee, the group formed
by (at least) two agents involved by such relation can indeed be said to have
distributed knowledge. In the present section we actually show that a coun-
terpart of the standard notion of Distributed Knowledge from Epistemic Logic
is correctly satisfied by our multiple ♦ introduction rule for a modal context
♦GΣ, which allows inference for the intersection of agents in , G = {1, . . . , n}.
Once this is proven to be the case, another obvious question arises concerning
the counterpart notion of Common Knowledge (see especially [34] and [24]): in
particular, we shall see that the presence of relations of Trusted Communica-
tions represent an actual limitation to the acquisition of Common Knowledge
and that our GΣ,G = {1, . . . , n} can indeed be defined as common knowledge
operator.
Consider two signed contexts, by now without any priority relation defined
over them:29
♦iΓ = {♦(S true),♦(T true),(U → ⊥ true)}
♦j∆ = {♦(S true),♦(U true),(T → ⊥ true)}
Distributed knowledge of ΣG = {Γi | ∆j} implies:
♦GΣ ` ♦i,j(S true)
obtained by eliminating in Γi the open variables that are no longer satisfiable
when Γj is taken as a possible extension, and vice versa. Recalling that DK is
obtained as an inference relation between non-reciprocally accessible epistemic
states (the ‘wise-man’), we use the structural properties of possibility contexts
to mimic the accessibility from inside the language. Strictly speaking, the re-
sulting content would still need to be verified (β-reduced) to turn it into proper
knowledge, but up to any further contextual extension being considered, this
would remain the only shared content among the involved states, hence to be
considered as their ‘knowledge’. This induces our next result:
Theorem 1 (♦G as a distributed knowledge operator).
♦GΣ ` ♦i,j(A true) iff Γi | ∆j ` A true for any (i, j) ∈
⋂
G
correspond to a non-standard fragment of a modal Kripke semantics is possible in view of a
variant of the constructive modal logic introduced in [1]. Then the fragment containing only
the  modality can be proven equivalent to S4 models, whereas with the ♦ operator it reduces
to a contextual format of KT♦. This result is shown in ongoing research, see [63].
28See [24].
29The following example is adapted accordingly from [24, p.24].
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Proof. To show that our ♦G operator corresponds indeed to the derivability
under two distinct indices, and hence is a DK operator, it is enough to recall
that ♦G satisfies in some form the standard properties for DK: Distribution is
induced by Definitions 12 and 18; Reflexivity by the corresponding rule from
§4.1; Transitivity holds in its ordered backward format by Transmission, whereas
Seriality holds only when taken in the context of communication, i.e. with its
relation to our -modality. The application of appropriate β-reductions leads
the set of valid formulae to those derivable in the axiomatization that is sound
and complete with respect to Reflexivity and Transitivity. The characteristic
standard properties of Distributed Knowledge are easily satisfied. For DK in
|G| = {1}, DK in G is equivalent to just dependent knowledge:
♦iΓ ` ♦i(A true)
DK1♦G=iΣ ` ♦G=i(A true)
which can be read in both top-down and bottom-up directions. For extensions
of G, the larger a G ⊆ G′ the greater the distributed knowledge of G′:
♦iΓ ` ♦i(A true) ♦iΓ | ♦j∆ ` ♦G=i,j(A true)
DKi⊂j♦G=i ⊆ ♦G=i,j(A true)
which is simply satisfied by the definition of admissible context extension.
Notice that by this definition, which mimics inclusions by single step contex-
tual extensions, the order of the signatures plays no role, as the pair of agents
is not an ordered pair. In the general argument, where |G| > {2}, each single
pair of agents needs to be considered in descending order: as Transitivity works
only backwards, for every ♦i,k(A true) and i < j < k ∈ G, there must be TCs’
such that ♦i,j(A true) and ♦j,k(A true).
An indirect way of proving that ♦G is an operator for DK, is to show that
no operation of CK obtains in the context of ♦G . This result corresponds to
proving that under ♦G at least one TC-relation occurs and that CK obtains
only when the number of TC in the system is reduced to zero.30
Theorem 2 (Trusted Communication as a bound to CK). Suppose that Σ =
〈◦i, ◦j , J, J ′〉 and i < j. Then for all judgements J ∈ Σ, Σ ` J iff TCj = 0.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the structure of Σ.
• The base case for J = 1, i = j corresponds to a Derivation with just one
step by the Autonomous Hypothesis Rule and no admissible extension of
the relevant context taken into account. This satisfies by definition the
validity of J into all contexts, it reduces TCj = 0 and by Definition 15
allows for iJ .
30In [24, p.149], Theorem 4.5.4 proves the impossibility to gain or lose CK in an interpreted
asynchronous message passing systems. Provided the appropriate identities between a run
and message events with respectively a Communication Chain and the number of Trusted
Communications in our system, it follows the identity of the two theorems for the acquisition
of CK. It also follows from the definition of CK as knowledge of every agent in an interpreted
system with more than one agent, see [34, sec.3].
27
• Where J = 1, i 6= j, we are considering a Derivation with at most one
application of multiple I-♦ rule, and the extension is admissible since by
hypothesis |G| ≥ 2. By application of the rule and the construction from
Definition 17, TCj = 1 and ♦GJ . From the conclusion of this Derivation,
I- can be applied to make the extension everywhere accessible, which is
the only rule to allow inference of GJ and hence of iJ . From the latter,
TCj is reduced to zero.
• Where J 6= 1, i 6= j, the case is similar to the previous one, with at least
one application of multiple I-♦ rule and TCj = |J − 1|. The previous
procedure applies to any occurrence of such a derivation step with |J − 1|
applications of I-.
This theorem says something slightly stronger than what holds for asyn-
chronous message passing systems where unreliable communication is used. It
says that nothing becomes common knowledge unless it is also knowledge in the
absence of trusted communication, i.e. common knowledge does not hold if the
communication chain is not reduced to verifiability at each point. We can now
formulate our final result:
Theorem 3 (G as a common knowledge operator).
GΣ ` i,j(A true) iff Γi ` A true for all i ∈ G
Proof. The standard properties of CK are satisfied by the definition of GJ as
holding iff ∅ | Γi∈G ` J , which expresses admissibility of contexts extensions
within G:
• CK is equivalent to its conjunction with the fact that everyone in G knows:
use Lemma 1 on the admissibility of Trusted Communication and multiple
I-, by which every source needs to be admissible and its β-redex induces
the  operator.
• If ΣG ` J and this implies Γi ⊆ Σ ` (J ∧ J ′) for every i ∈ G, then
GΣ ` GJ ′, which is proven again by induction: for |G| = 1 this requires
only the admissibility of Γi ` J , this will imply by hypothesis Γi ` (J∧J ′),
and hence by definition iΓ ` iJ ′. If |G| > 1, then there is TCk−1
which makes Γi | ∆k admissible. As by the previous argument, if the
context extension is admissible, Γi | ∆k ` (J ∧ J ′) and by I- we have
i,kΣ ` i,kJ ′.
A comparison is due with the results for Justified Common Knowledge pre-
sented in [4]. The notion of Justified knowledge in the form a modal operator Jφ
(φ is justified) is the forgetful projection of an evidence assertion t :φ ([4, p.12]).
This operator for common knowledge is defined in a language which contains
multi-modalities, as for our mathcalG operator and it satisfies the Fixed-Point
Axiom in each of the fragment of modal logics Tn, S4n, S5n. This represent the
first basic distinction with our operator for common knowledge: as we deal with
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a constructive language, the iteration of operators is restricted to positive intro-
spection, hence Axiom 5 (respectively, Symmetricity on frames) is not validated.
Moreover, the validity of Reflexivity is considered in the two fragments of the
language, the one that admits only i operator, the other where expression with
♦i operators are considered; in the latter case the corresponding axiom is taken
in its appropriate formulation Tn♦ . Finally, soundness and completeness are ob-
viously proven in different ways, as the logic of Justified Common Knowledge is
presented in the first place as a modal logic, and then a Gentzen- Hilbert-style
system is introduced.
6. Properties on Modal Frames for Trusted Communications and
Knowledge
In this section we sketch completeness results of our rules w.r.t. correspond-
ing modal frames. In terms of Kripke structures, our modal operators ♦G andG
will have to be definable in terms of modal frames F :< K,R > with a nonempty
set of states K = {K1, . . . ,Kn}, first for each ♦1, . . .♦n occurring in our TCs
and then for the states where global validity is ensured; R = {R1, . . . , Rn} rep-
resent the set of indexed binary relations for each pair of modalities ♦i,♦j in a
TC and i,j .
Let us start with a Kripke modelM which valuates the primitive propositions
derivable under ♦/GΣ. This will turn out to be a non-standard model sound
and complete with the multi-modal version of KT♦:31
Kn♦ i(A ⊃ B)→ (♦iA ⊃ ♦iB)
Tn♦ A→ ♦iA
4<n ♦j♦iA→ ♦iA
Modus Ponens
Where all occurrences of ♦i operators have been substituted by a i, we obtain
a correspondence with a S4-model. We show in the following how the rules
satisfy corresponding properties on frames.
We start with the Reflexivity Rule:
Lemma 2 (Reflexivity over States). For every derivation Γi−n ` ♦i(A true),
A true∗ ⇒ ♦i(A true) is a reflexive relation over A.
Proof. Reflexivity in our modal models means that for every state Ki corre-
sponding to one indexed modality, it holds KiR
iKi. This means that construct-
ing the appropriate relation in a canonical model for ♦i(A true), if Ki  A then
Ki  ♦iA. This corresponds to our A true∗ ⇒ ♦i(A true). To prove that
this holds, suppose by contradiction that given Ki  A then Ki 2 ♦A: so
Ki  ¬♦A, then A becomes not admissible at i, i.e. there is no context exten-
sion Γ | ∆ that validates ♦i(A true) so that Ki 2 A, contrary to the hypothesis.
Hence A true∗ ⇒ ♦i(A true) holds, and the rule corresponds to KiRiKi for
states.
31It is a fragment of the constructive contextual modal logic introduced in [1]. A full analysis
of the conditions on frames for such semantics is presented in [63].
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Let us consider now Transmission. Its meaning is reflected by a backward
ordered transitivity relation:
Lemma 3 (Backward Ordered Transitivity over States). For every derivation
Γi ` ♦j(A true), ♦i♦j(A true) ⇒ ♦i(A true) is a (backward only) ordered
transitive relation over A.
Proof. Backward Transitivity in our modal models can be explained as follows:
for every Ki,Kj ,Kk if KkR
kKj and KjR
jKi, then KkR
iKi; in other words, if
Kj  ♦A and KiRjKj , then it holds Ki  ♦A. As the accessibility relation is
mimicked in the derivability relation, this simulates the iteration ♦i♦j and it
implies the reduction to the lower indexed state. This is what implemented by
our 4<n axiom. Let us show that Transitivity does not hold forward. Its validity
means that for every Ki,Kj ,Kk if KiR
iKj and KjR
jKk, then KiR
kKk, or in
other words, if Ki  ♦A it holds Kj  ♦A for every Rj and hence  A. Let
now M be a model based on F such that Ki  ♦A, and which still satisfies
Kk  ♦¬A. This is still possible as Symmetry fails (see step 2 in the proof
of the following Lemma 4); this model still satisfies Ki  ♦A. Such M is not
transitive, and neither can F be.
It follows that frames for ♦G are (only) reflexive:
Lemma 4 (Frames for ♦GΣ). For every judgement A true such that Γk,∆k `
♦i(A true) holds implementing a Communication Chain as by Definition 16,
there is a model M  A such that for every frame F :< K,R > on which M is
based, F is reflexive.
Proof.
1. Reflexivity is immediate by Lemma 2.
2. Symmetry means that if Kj  ♦A, then Ki  A. It is not difficult to show
that if Kj  ♦A, then Ki  ♦¬A can still be obtained, so that symmetry
fails. Suppose Kj  ♦A, and KiRiKj , i.e. there is an admissible TC
ending with ♦j ; then there is no admissible step that implies  A, for any
TC, therefore it is still admissible a TCk = 〈♦j ,♦k,¬A〉, hence Ki  ♦¬A
and Ki 2 A, contrary to the hypothesis.
3. Backward ordered transitivity is immediate by Lemma 3; by the same
Lemma general Transitivity fails.
Theorem 4. Rules for our ♦G operator are sound and complete to models of
KTn♦4
<n.
Proof. Immediate from lemmas 2 and 4 and standard argument of soundness
and completeness of KT4 for reflexive frames adapted for the T♦ axiom and
restricted over the axiom 4.
Similarly, we sketch here the proof that establishes the models of formulas
derivable under the G to be sound and complete with respect to the modal
logic S4n. For this we need the following:
Lemma 5 (Transitivity over States). For every derivation Γi,∆j ` kJ ,
i,jA true⇒ i,jk(A true) is a transitive relation over A.
30
Proof. Transitivity in a our modal models means that for every Ki,Kj ,Kk if
KiR
iKj and KjR
jKk, then KiR
kKk, or in other words, if Ki  A it holds
Kj  A for every Rj and hence  A. By I rule, Kk  A holds as well by
definition and properties of our operator. Now transitivity holds over any index
and iteration is both ascending and descending.
Lemma 6 (Reflexive and Transitive Frames for GΣ). For every judgement
A true such that Γk,∆k ` i(A true) holds implementing a Communication
Chain as by Definition 16, there is model M  A such that for every frame
F :< K,R > on which M is based, F is reflexive and transitive.
Proof. Immediate, by preservation of Reflexivity by GΣ and Lemma 5.
Theorem 5. Rules for our G operator are sound and complete to models of
S4n.
Proof. Immediate from lemmas 5 and 6 and standard argument of soundness
and completeness of S4 for reflexive and transitive frames.
7. Discussion
The debate on testimony is wide and heterogeneous, and different analyses
have been provided from a variety of points of view, e.g. in the debate between
reductionism and anti-reductionism or within the framework of social episte-
mology, [6], [32] and [33] and [27]. Many of the contributions to the debate on
testimony agree in considering it linked in some way to trust, see for example
[12], [35], [75], [69], [31], [7] and [41]. Trust has been considered the source of
epistemic justification for the receiver of the message to believe the communi-
cated message to be true. This is a problematic thesis; even once this is accepted
other problems arise, since one has not explained yet whether and how trust
can provide such a justification, and what the reasons are that justify R’s de-
cision to trust S in transmitting true messages. In our approach, we explicitly
distinguish between contents that are presented together with their justification
and contents transmitted without.
This distinction is formally justified and it allows for implicitly endorsing a
notion of trust in the language. In this paper we have analyzed the relation
between testimony and trust on the basis of the definition of trust put forward
in [72], where it is argued that testimony is an occurrence of a first-order relation
of communication affected by the second-order property of trust, and the view
is defended that an epistemic agent can acquire some knowledge, on the basis
of the information communicated through testimony, if and only if the agent
is able to connect the transmitted information to the conceptual network of
interrelation to which it belongs.32 In the present context, we have translated
acquisition of knowledge in terms of verification processes that survive network
extensions. The notion of trust as a second order property remains the crucial
theoretical feature on which the calculus is constructed, something that clearly
differs from most well-known formal treatment of trust as in [19].
32Such a thesis is supported by Floridi’s Network Theory of Account (NTA), see [25] and
[26, ch. 12].
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The notion of communication as presented in the context of processes of
group knowledge has found its formal explanation mostly in multi-agent epis-
temic logics, see [24], [54], and their various modal and dynamic translations, see
[8], [22]. These systems have recently been extended to accommodate various
interpretations of the notions of trust and testimony. The current approaches
privilege the interpretation of trust as a modal operator ranging over agents
(“Agent a trusts agent b”), and the corresponding informal explanation can
vary. The formal treatment is mostly model-theoretic. In [9], trust relations
are modeled in terms of graphs designed over the plausibility models for belief
revision: this has led to a different task, namely a dynamic definition of doxastic
merging states by sharing information via acts of sincere communication in [10],
stressing the property of reliable communication. The notion of sincerity of a
communication act is defined as sharing of information that was already ac-
cepted by the speaker; reliability is defined in terms of the notion of (common)
knowledge. Notice here the crucial distinction with our system: in our language
both sincerity and reliability are informal properties that can only be induced
in terms of entirely well-defined syntactical procedures of verification, and the
notion of common knowledge is derived.
A variant of this model-theoretic approach is presented in [39], where a
dynamic testimonial logic combines a conditional doxastic logic and a dynamic
logic of belief upgrade, enriched with a belief suspension operator: in this setting
so-called “authority graphs” are designed to capture agents’ epistemic trust in
other agents’ testimony. The latter property is embedded in the derivability
relation of our language, which presents a more rigid notion of hierarchy for
authorities, but which comes for free with the structure of our contexts.
Another propositional dynamic logic approach to trust and commitment
is presented in [13], in which the violation of stronger commitments results in
higher loss of trustworthiness than the violation of weaker ones, hence describing
an agent that proposes and accepts engagements in commitments, and violates
them by performing actions other than the ones committed to. Such a dy-
namics can be easily mimicked in terms of an appropriate interpretation of the
contextual dynamics proper of Martin-Lo¨f’s Type Theory.
Another recent modal approach that combines the analysis of belief states
with the reliability of information sources is presented in [47]. In this framework,
agents are allowed to keep track of the information sources via a signature
system that recalls ours, but the hierarchical structure these sources form is
entirely different, as it orders sources from the more to the less reliable and in
this way allows agents to select information and to adapts her own belief state
on that basis. This is certainly a very interesting dynamic to explore on the
representation of sources and it would be a step forward in adding conceptual
complexity to our model.
What all these models are characterized by is the usual intuition that belief
states are basically not different from knowledge states, so that their epistemic
notions are indistinguishable, contrary to what we aim at in our model. Another
approach in the same direction as ours is represented by the debate on trust for
theories of defeasible knowledge (see e.g. [11]).
The notion of trust has received attention especially in the study of informa-
tion systems and distributed computing. We have already mentioned that our
system can be easily transformed in an operational semantics, using the under-
lying Curry-Howard isomorphism which establshes the proofs-as-programs and
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propositions- or formulae-as-types interpretation (see [71] for a complete pre-
sentation). Let us in the following compare with some of the systems present in
the literature.
The task in [44] is to provide computational declarative definitions for trust
relations between interacting agents as first-order predicates, where the group
of mutually trusting agents form the trust domain in a distributed system,
and to obtain computational complexity results for deciding trust relationships.
Informally the relation of trust is given as belief or knowledge of behavior’s
predictability. From the computational point of view, this task is specified in
the context of web-based applications and computer-communication networks.
Our contribution aims at providing a more general definition to the epistemic
notion of trust. Defining it as a second-order relation we implicitly maintain
that using a set of atomic propositions to refer to agent’s correctness as the
object of trust implies the impossibility of making a distinction between dif-
ferent properties such that the same agent is correct about one, and incor-
rect about the other. One can still avoid such a problem by naming explicitly
the object of trust, as it is indeed done in [44] by adding naming in the form
correctPKI correctWebOfTrust, but this seems a complication from a theo-
retical viewpoint and the solution we propose seems more elegant. Moreover,
according to the latter system, the distinction among the agents’ epistemic
states involved in the trust relation is completely irrelevant: by means of a trust
relation, knowledge of P holding for agent a induces knowledge of P in agent
b, so that trust is just a function for selecting communicating agents. Our lan-
guage uses a dependency relation to characterize trustworthy communications
of contents between agents, whereas in the semantic approaches mentioned, the
communication is usually taken meta-theoretically, or can be added via an ad-
ditional predicate that would take the form (comm(b, P, a)), hence requiring the
second order level if that has to be given the property of trust (namely via an
additional predicate of the form Trust(comm(b, P, a))).
A procedural notion of trust, loosely based on the general analysis given
in [52], is presented in [16]: it gives an agent-based, degree-oriented notion of
trust that allows interaction among entities and enforces transmission of such a
property, but it lacks both a restriction over the object of trust – because it is
given as a function over agents – and the epistemic analysis of the agents’ states
that we include as central to our definition.
A recent approach is the generalization of the interpretation from [21] of
trust based on mental attitudes given in the already mentioned [19], where it is
stated: “only a cognitive agent can trust another agent; only an agent endowed
with goals and belief.” (p.38). The latter is then combined with the degree-
based quantitative approach, see [19, ch.3]. The same conceptual qualitative
tools used in this latter approach to analyze trust and reputation, namely goal,
capability, power, and willingness, have been used in a multi-agent setting to
evaluate agents’ behavior in the scope of collective beliefs, see [36]. This ap-
proach is refined in [37], using a logic of time, action, beliefs and choices and by
distinguishing occurrent trust from dispositional trust.
Another model of formalization of trust relations based on modal logics is
given in [46], where the relationship among belief, information acquisition and
trust is both semantically and axiomatically characterized so that belief and
information acquisition operators are respectively represented by KD45 and
KD normal modalities, whereas trust is denoted by a modal operator with
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minimal semantics. This framework is further extended in [20] to include the
the derivation of trust from other notions. To do so, extensions with respect to
relevance of topics and questions are introduced.
In [74], trust is a function defined between a host and a client over a set
of actions and a set of effects of such actions, and such that it holds if the
expectations of the host about the effects of the actions of the client are positive.
This might be seen as a notion similar to ours, where we focus especially on
positive epistemic actions, but its structure appears less informative from the
point of view of epistemic states (it misses the doxastic representation).
A different approach to trust for distributed systems is presented in [76],
based on set-theoretic operations defined over a quadruple composed by the set
of trustors, the one of trustees, one of conditions and one of properties. The
intended meaning is that under a given set of circumstances (conditions), the
set of trustors trust the set of trustees about a given set of properties, the latter
partitioned in a set of actions and a set of attributes. This strategy seems similar
to our definition of trust as a second-order property, but the main difference is
that their notion of trust is a primitive and ours is restricted to the declarative
assertion of holding of a given property, hence focusing in the first place on a
message-passing system.
A formal semantics for ontologies that focuses in particular on transitivity
of trust relations is given in the already mentioned [40].
Along with the powerful model-theoretic treatments, different proof-theories
have been adapted recently to an appropriate multi-agent setting to define
group-based notions of knowledge: a natural deduction non-epistemic language
in [28], a Gentzen’s style sequent calculus in [58] and, at least for the syntactic
intuition behind it, the already largely mentioned Artemov’s logic of proofs.
We are moreover aware of some yet unpublished work on the formalization of
group knowledge via hypersequent systems. The added value of these systems is
given by their ability to represent different knowledge modalities to sort among
the contents and to make explicit the formulation of the information sources.
Among these syntactic approaches, our formal system provides an original treat-
ment of trusted communications, to our knowledge the first doing so explicitly
for human-like messaging systems that adopts a type-theoretic interpretation.
The multi-modal extension of our type-theory is derived from the mono-modal
case formulated in [65] and motivated by problems similar to those inspiring
other formulations of modal type theories, such as in [61] and [57]. They all
have different applications, especially to Distributed and Staged Computation,
see [56], [55], [66]. Among other calculi that treats explicitly the notion of trust
for computing, let us here just remember: a process calculus for trust manage-
ment in [17]; the machinery used for the formal verification of security protocols
applied to security and trust processes in [48].
The body of further work that converges on this topic from philosophy,
(formal) epistemology and computer science is impressive and we have given
reference only to those works that most directly relate to this contribution.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a formal model for epistemic processes qual-
ified by trust. It relies on two basic novelties, strictly related to each other: the
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first is that we consider trust as a second-order property that characterizes rela-
tions of communications; the second is that so qualified relations are presented
in a type-theoretic system that fully allows for their formalization. By consid-
ering trust as a second-order relation, we avoids formalizing it at the same level
of the underlying epistemic relation: in the present formulation, trust has been
formally defined as a function over epistemic states and affecting a propositional
content. An obvious advantage of the here introduced language is that it makes
possible the representation of multi-agent interactions and it is embedded into
the syntactical equivalent of a non-homogeneous language for modal operators,
allowing the representation of the central notions of Common and Distributed
Knowledge. A further step in this research will be represented by a consis-
tent extension of this analysis to the cases of communications characterized by
mistrust and distrust.
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